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Finance and the Earth system – exploring the links 1 
between financial actors and non-linear changes in 2 
the climate system   3 
 2 
Abstract 4 
Financial actors and capital play a key role in extractive economic activities around 5 
the world, as well as in current efforts to avoid dangerous climate change. Here, in 6 
contrast to standard approaches in finance, sustainability and climate change, we 7 
elaborate in what ways financial actors affect key biomes around the world, and 8 
through this known “tipping elements” in the Earth system. We combine Earth system 9 
and sustainability sciences with corporate finance to develop a methodology that 10 
allows us to link financial actors to economic activities modifying biomes of key 11 
importance for stabilizing Earth’s climate system. Our analysis of key owners of 12 
companies operating in the Amazon rainforest (Brazil) and boreal forests (Russia and 13 
Canada) identifies a small set of international financial actors with considerable, but 14 
as of yet unrealized, globally spanning influence. We denote these “Financial Giants”, 15 
and elaborate how incentives and disincentives currently influence their potential to 16 
bolster or undermine the stability of the Earth’s climate system.  17 
 18 
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 3 
1. Introduction 25 
Humans have become the main driving force behind global environmental change at 26 
unprecedented scales (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al. 2015; Worm and Paine 27 
2016). However, not all of the world’s regions are affected by, nor affect, the climate 28 
system in the same way. A number of specific biomes and biogeophysical processes 29 
have been highlighted as exceptionally important for global climate stability due to 30 
their ability to affect feedback dynamics in the Earth system (Steffen et al. 2015). 31 
These different biomes and Earth system processes have variously been 32 
conceptualized as “sleeping giants” in the carbon cycle (Steffen 2006), “tipping 33 
elements” in the Earth system (Lenton et al. 2008), and “planetary-scale tipping 34 
points” (Barnosky et al. 2012; Lenton and Williams 2013). Changes in the stability of 35 
tipping elements are increasingly being accounted for in climate models (Cornell et 36 
al. 2012), and include, among other things, deforestation (Steffen et al. 2004). Forest 37 
biomes are of particular importance as tipping elements because of the nature of their 38 
biogeophysical climate feedbacks. Of all the major forests on the planet, the Amazon 39 
and the boreal forests are of particular importance; more so than temperate forests and 40 
Asian rainforests (Snyder et al. 2004; West et al. 2011; Steffen et al. 2015, see also 41 
Supporting Information 1). Their disproportionate influence on climate stability 42 
suggest that in order to safeguard a prosperous future for humanity, society needs to 43 
consider approaches that, in addition to emission reductions, maintain and enhance 44 
resilience of these forested biomes (and other tipping elements) (Schellnhuber et al. 45 
2016; Rockström et al. 2017).  46 
 47 
 4 
Financial actors, such as international development banks, institutional investors, 48 
credit rating agencies and international commercial banks, are increasingly interested 49 
in the financial risks of climate change and associated changes in ecosystems. In 50 
parallel, scholarly interest in the climate-finance nexus has also increased. This 51 
includes work on e.g. “green bonds” and other impact investments, assessment of 52 
climate-related financial risk and insurance mechanisms, ESG measures and 53 
differential performance of socially responsible investment portfolios, as well as 54 
drivers of responsible investment (Collier et al. 2009; Sievänen et al. 2013; Revelli 55 
and Viviani 2015; Müller and Kreuer 2016; Battiston et al. 2017; OECD 2017; 56 
Scholtens 2017). 57 
 58 
Two gaps emerge in relation to this development, particularly in the finance industry. 59 
First, while the growth in the “green bonds” market is impressive, it represents only a 60 
fraction of global capital flows: less than 0.2% of debt securities issued globally 61 
(OECD 2017 p. 23). Second, avoiding dangerous climate change requires taking 62 
account of the non-linear, threshold dynamics encompassed by the tipping elements 63 
outlined above (Steffen et al. 2018). However, most current “green” financial 64 
initiatives focus primarily on various ways to reduce emissions through e.g. 65 
divestment, or renewable energy, energy efficiency and low-carbon transport 66 
investments — the latter three together representing 79% of the green bond market 67 
(OECD 2017 p. 25).  68 
 69 
Thus, while reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission is crucially important to 70 
avoid dangerous climate change, it is not enough (Steffen et al. 2018). Bolstering the 71 
capacity of key tipping elements to prevent them from “tipping” is equally essential. 72 
 5 
Ignoring the non-linear dynamics encompassed by tipping elements could have 73 
detrimental effects on the ambitions set by the Paris Agreement, and threaten the 74 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (Schellnhuber et al. 2016; 75 
Rockström et al. 2017). It also has repercussions for economic stability and financial 76 
risk (Lawrence and Vandecar 2015; Chatterjee et al. 2016; UNEP Inquiry 2016; 77 
Battiston et al. 2017; Scholtens 2017). 78 
 79 
This paper combines Earth system and sustainability science with corporate finance, 80 
to explore how the links between financial investment and non-linear climate 81 
dynamics can be analyzed. This is not only of interest to policy and financial actors, 82 
but also for scholars interested in understanding how key global actors affect the 83 
climate system either through their position in global markets (cf. Österblom et al. 84 
2015), or through processes of “telecoupling” (Liu et al. 2015). Telecoupling refers to 85 
the connections between geographically separate biomes and economic activities. 86 
These global connections between human and natural systems have both 87 
socioeconomic and environmental effects (Liu et al. 2015). In the context of finance 88 
and the biosphere, such telecoupling emerges from the fact that financial investments 89 
and investment policy decisions may have cross-continental social and ecological 90 
effects. Documented examples include international investments in companies 91 
associated with land use change through e.g. palm oil production in Borneo (WWF 92 
and EnviroMarket 2012), or sustainable investment policies by major pension funds 93 
which increase the pressure on corporations to improve their environmental, social 94 
and governance performance (Galaz et al. 2015).    95 
 96 
 6 
We propose a novel methodology to identify the ways in which financial actors and 97 
flows of capital are linked to biomes associated with key tipping elements in Earth’s 98 
climate system and ask: 99 
 100 
a) Is it possible to identify a limited set of financial actors mediating flows of 101 
capital to known tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system? 102 
b) What incentives and mechanisms of influence exists for these actors to alter 103 
investments in support of global climate stability?     104 
 105 
2. Methods and data 106 
2.1. Selection of cases  107 
A number of regional biomes and associated Earth system processes have been 108 
proposed as tipping elements, whose dynamics, if disrupted through multiple 109 
feedbacks in the Earth system, could contribute to the destabilization of the global 110 
climate system (Lenton et al. 2008 and references therein; Steffen et al. 2018). Here 111 
we select two of these known biomes – the Amazon tropical forest in Brazil and the 112 
boreal forests in Canada and Russia (Figure 1). The resilience of these biomes is 113 
linked to both climatic and non-climatic anthropogenic drivers, such as deforestation 114 
driven by economic activities and their associated financial inputs (see Supporting 115 
Information 1 for details and known threshold uncertainties).  116 
 117 
[Figure 1 placeholder] 118 
 119 
 7 
It should be noted that market structure, financing of corporate operations, and a 120 
firm’s influence on key drivers of change of tipping elements, can differ considerably 121 
depending on the sector and the country of interest. Table 1 summarizes the corporate 122 
structure in the selected biomes, and shows the level of concentration in each sector, 123 
across both publicly listed companies and in private and other companies (see 124 
Supporting Information 2 and 3, as well as tables S1 and S2 for limitations, detailed 125 
data and information about available data depending on company type). Table 1 126 
shows that concentration is high in all four sectors and motivates our focus on the 127 
major owners of the dominant companies operating in the biomes. 128 
 129 
[Table 1 placeholder] 130 
 131 
As noted earlier, our selection of biomes is based on the strength of biogeophysical 132 
feedbacks of these forests to the climate system. As such, the sample provides a 133 
strategic first selection to illustrate the strength of the methodology as well as the kind 134 
of insights provided. The methodology could also be applied to assess links between 135 
financial actors and other critical ecosystem services or “planetary boundaries”, such 136 
as biodiversity. We leave this for future research. 137 
 138 
2.2. Different finance modes of importance for 139 
mapping links between the biosphere and financial 140 
sectors 141 
Financial actors contribute to biome modifications by financing the extractive 142 
activities of companies. Financing generally occurs through a combination of loans 143 
 8 
and bonds, and through stock (also known as equity), where stocks are issued either 144 
through an initial public offering or so-called seasoned offerings (Mayer 1990; Rajan 145 
and Zingales 1995; Booth et al. 2001). Hence both equity and debt are important for 146 
understanding the links between financial actors and our focal biomes.  147 
 148 
However, from a finance perspective, there is a fundamental difference between 149 
stocks, and bonds and loans. Bonds and loans relate to a usually fixed claim on part of 150 
the revenues of a project or firm. With debt, financiers can reveal their preference 151 
with origination: they may withhold capital from environmental laggards, thus 152 
signaling discontent and pushing down prices. Financiers may also include covenants 153 
in the debt contract relating to environmental performance. Violation of a covenant 154 
may trigger default. Stock on the other hand, holds a residual claim on the firms’ 155 
profits and has ownership rights allowing stockholders to vote about strategic 156 
decisions of the firm and the appointment of top executives. As such, the role of stock 157 
is more prominent than that of other types of finance in the governance of the firm 158 
(Edmans 2014). In addition, stock ownership also determines the potential degree to 159 
which any one investor has influence over corporate decisions, operations, and thus 160 
strategic development (Apple et al., 2016).  161 
 162 
There are three main mechanisms by which influence can be achieved by 163 
shareholders: voting (or proxy voting in the case of investment managers, Dam and 164 
Scholtens 2013); direct engagement with management, either informally or through 165 
systematic engagement (Dimson et al. 2015); and divestment (or the threat of it), 166 
which may push stock prices down and signal discontent by investors with the 167 
corporate governance of the firm (Edmans 2014).  168 
 9 
 169 
Mapping the ownership of financial assets in firms, the capital flows from financial 170 
actors to companies, and the specific economic activities of firms on the ground is not 171 
straightforward due to severe limits in the availability of financial data. While data on 172 
shareholders is freely available for publicly listed companies, data on loans is not 173 
generally easily accessible due to the opacity of banks’ balance sheets, especially their 174 
loans section. Ownership of private firms is in addition highly opaque (Morgan 2002; 175 
Flannery et al. 2004; Stiroh 2006). Limited access to financial data is not a problem 176 
exclusively for our analysis, but an issue for studies in this domain in general (Galaz 177 
et al. 2018).  178 
 179 
Given the limited accessibility of detailed debt data, and the influence associated with 180 
stock ownership, our main analysis uses equity data and maps the ownership of 181 
financial actors in key corporations that currently affect the ecological dynamics of 182 
our focal biomes. We also assess the sensitivity of the firms to financiers by 183 
calculating the debt to capital ratio for all companies in our sample, and compare 184 
them to industry-wide averages (Damodaran 2017). 185 
 186 
2.3. Data analysis 187 
To assess linkages between financial systems and tipping elements in a systematic 188 
way, we develop an interdisciplinary and exploratory methodology that combines 189 
insights from the Earth system and sustainability sciences with corporate finance. The 190 
details, as well as limitations, can be found in Supporting Information (2), and include 191 
five steps: a) identification of the main proximate drivers of land-use change in each 192 
biome (sensu Geist and Lambin 2002); b) identification of the most important 193 
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industrial sectors associated with these drivers in the selected biomes; c) identification 194 
of the largest companies in each sector in terms of market share; d) data analysis of 195 
the ownership in selected strategic companies; and e) identification of the prevalent 196 
stockholders, that is, financial actors with ownership in at least one company 197 
operating in each of the selected biomes and sectors linked to tipping elements.  198 
 199 
The selection of companies in c) is based on their market share in the sector of interest 200 
only, without incorporating any company-specific environmental assessment. Several 201 
of the companies in our analysis have deforestation policies in place, but are included 202 
by virtue of their size and market dominance. By being vertically integrated and by 203 
providing enhanced market access to a vast amount of producers (particularly in 204 
Brazil), we argue that selected companies can influence the rest of the supply chain, 205 
as well as have spill-over effects on market competitors. The chosen forestry 206 
companies in Canada and Russia control a large landbank and represent a substantial 207 
revenue share in the sector, therefore making their forest management policies crucial 208 
to forest degradation and forest cover loss. 209 
 210 
As we elaborate below, the stockholders identified in e) can influence drivers of 211 
environmental change in multiple regions at the same time. Through their investments 212 
policies or engagement strategies they could therefore in principle affect multiple 213 
known tipping elements simultaneously.  214 
 215 
Analysis of ownership is based on data from the Orbis database which contains 216 
information on over 200 million companies worldwide (Bureau van Dijk 2017). Note 217 
that identification of prevalent stockholders is only possible for listed companies and 218 
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private companies with known owners. For several private companies in our selection 219 
(7 out of 29 companies), no information about shareholders is available through 220 
databases like Orbis. We calculate the debt ratio as the book value of debt (both long-221 
term and short-term), divided by total book value of debt and shareholders' equity 222 
(based on Damodaran 2017). For detailed information on calculations and full list of 223 
company ratios, see Supporting Information (5).  224 
 225 
3. Results and Discussion 226 
3.1. “Prevalent stockholders”: who are they and why 227 
are they important? 228 
Large financial actors have been shown to possess significant corporate control 229 
globally (Vitali et al. 2011; Fichtner et al. 2017). Until now, however, such control 230 
has not been linked to changes in biomes associated with tipping dynamics in the 231 
Earth’s climate system. Table 2 lists what we denote as prevalent stockholders, and 232 
estimates of their “blockholding” power in key companies operating in each selected 233 
biome associated with a tipping element (see Supporting Information 4 for more 234 
details). We label these owners as “Financial Giants” because of their size and 235 
potential to influence companies. They are ranked according to the number of 236 
companies in which they own shares, here denoted “ownership breadth” (see Fichtner 237 
et al. 2017). Blockholding generally refers to shareholding of at least 5% (Edmans 238 
2014), and is in the finance literature generally assumed to entail considerable 239 
influence over corporate governance.  240 
 241 
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[Table 2 placeholder] 242 
 243 
As our data show, these prevalent stockholders include a variety of financial actors 244 
ranging from international banks to institutional investors such as insurance 245 
companies, asset managers, and pension funds. All prevalent stockholders in Table 2 246 
have shares in five or more of the selected companies. Six have individual 247 
blockholdings (≥ 5% of the shares) in at least one company. Two thirds are based in 248 
the US, including five of the top seven actors (in terms of ownership breadth).  249 
 250 
Stockholders can coordinate their voting on issues related to corporate control 251 
(elaborated below). Therefore, it is also interesting to assess these actors’ aggregated 252 
influence in each of the selected biomes. In Figure 2, we choose a 10% ownership 253 
level to indicate considerable voice in corporate governance that could be mobilized 254 
by these actors. This is the level usually applied to identify so-called “insiders” in the 255 
US corporate context. We also calculate the aggregated ownership of different 256 
coalitions based on possible patterns of potential collaboration between stockholders 257 
(elaborated below).   258 
 259 
[Figure 2 placeholder] 260 
 261 
Our analysis shows that the largest passive asset managers in the world, the “Big 262 
Three” (Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street) together hold stocks above the 10%-263 
threshold in 2 of 8 companies in the Amazon biome, 2 out of 16 in Canada’s boreal 264 
forests, and 3 of 5 in Russia’s boreal forests. The “Big Three” are known to 265 
collectively represent the largest corporate stockholders in the US (Fichtner et al. 266 
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2017), but their ownership has never before been linked to their influence on climate 267 
stability.  268 
 269 
The 16 identified prevalent stockholders have an even larger aggregate potential 270 
influence. Findings indicate that these reach above the 10%-threshold in 3 of 8 271 
companies in the Amazon, 5 of 16 in Canadian boreal forests, and 3 of 5 in Russian 272 
boreal forests. In seven of the 29 companies, the prevalent stockholders collectively 273 
represent the largest single stockholder. 274 
 275 
A complementary measure of their influence relates to the concentration of equity 276 
ownership in each of the selected companies. High concentrations of equity 277 
ownership (in this case a high value on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index) also 278 
indicates the latent influence of equity owners. As Table 3 shows, such concentration 279 
is substantial for companies in the beef sector in Brazil, for economic activities in 280 
boreal forests in Canada and partly also in Russia (see also Supporting Information 4).  281 
 282 
[Table 3 placeholder] 283 
 284 
Figure 2 and Table 3 thus show that as a collective, the “Financial Giants”, through 285 
their common blockholding power, have a previously ignored, yet considerable 286 
potential influence in companies shaping biomes critical for the stability of the 287 
climate system. 288 
 289 
3.2 Complementary mechanisms for influence 290 
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The previous section focused on equity as a means for the financial sector to exert 291 
influence over the fate of known tipping elements. Influence associated with 292 
ownership is, however, only attainable in listed companies. To what extent ownership 293 
influence alone is able to also translate into impacts on the sector as a whole, depends 294 
to a large extent on the composition of listed and non-listed companies, with the latter 295 
being more dependent on alternative funding. As mentioned above, debt is an 296 
important alternative financing mechanism for companies. However, debtholders lack 297 
control rights and have fewer means to influence corporate strategy (apart from 298 
including covenants in the contracts).  299 
 300 
Table 4 shows the total book debt to capital of the selected companies, presented per 301 
sector and compared to industry averages. All our focal companies in the beef sector 302 
rely heavily on debt. In the Canadian forestry sector a few companies (4) rely heavily 303 
on debt (see Supporting Information 5 and Table S3 for details). The debt ratio in the 304 
four sectors studied does not differ that much from global industry averages, as there 305 
is much variation in these figures (Damodaran 2017; Appel et al., 2016).  306 
 307 
[Table 4 placeholder] 308 
 309 
In summary, the influence of “Financial Giants” on companies is considerable, but the 310 
extent differs depending on sector, and where companies operate. The investors’ 311 
latent influence is largest in the beef and soy sectors associated with activities 312 
modifying the Amazon tipping element, but the influence of the “Financial Giants” is 313 
still substantive in the other industries and regions. All four sectors show relatively 314 
high concentration and dominant power in their respective market, and are sensitive to 315 
 15 
external financing. Further, there is concentrated ownership of equity in the firms 316 
operating in each sector. As such, we conclude that the “Financial Giants” have the 317 
potential to influence corporate strategy in the Amazon and boreal forests.  318 
 319 
3.3 Financial Giants – influence over climate stability 320 
and transformation 321 
Despite limitations in available financial data, our methodology allows us to identify 322 
key financial actors with influence over economic activities modifying biomes 323 
associated with tipping elements in the Earth’s climate system. The specific 324 
stockholders listed are naturally related to the selection criteria imposed here, but the 325 
interesting issue is the concept (and existence) of prevalent stockholders with the 326 
hitherto unrealized influence on such tipping elements. While several of the prevalent 327 
stockholders identified have indeed publicly acknowledged climate-related risks, we 328 
argue that their continued substantial ownership in industries that impact on key 329 
biomes and Earth system tipping elements suggests they “punch below their weight” 330 
with regards to the promotion of corporate governance that bolsters the resilience of 331 
these biomes. 332 
 333 
The degree to which the influence of the “Financial Giants” can be used in favor of 334 
climate stability is an issue deserving more attention by scholars interested in 335 
exploring the role of financial flows for sustainability. For the financial institutions to 336 
become change agents would require concerted action by a coalition of the financial 337 
actors identified here. However, a number of possible factors could be seen as barriers 338 
to an influence of this sort.  339 
 16 
 340 
The first is the comparatively marginal economic role the ownership in these 341 
companies play for the portfolios of the identified prevalent stockholders. As an 342 
example, while investments of one of the largest asset managers (#1 in Table 2) in the 343 
selected biomes and economic sectors are considerable (we estimate them to be USD 344 
8 billion), they represent only a fraction (<0,01%) of the total assets under 345 
management by this investor, estimated to be of a total value of USD 5.1 trillion 346 
(BlackRock 2017). Furthermore, several actors in Table 2 (#1, #2, #4, and #7) are 347 
commonly referred to as passive investors. These are investors who provide 348 
investment vehicles that track a market index or a specific market segment, activities 349 
which do not rely on active investment, such as voting and engaging. These investors 350 
not only invest on behalf of their clients (such as pension funds), but are also often 351 
assumed to lack incentives for exercising influence over individual companies, due to 352 
associated costs. In addition, coordination problems and free-rider dynamics can arise 353 
when the number of blockholders in any one company increases, decreasing 354 
individual incentives to act (Dam and Scholtens 2013; Edmans 2014). Together, this 355 
would imply that the identified financial actors might lack incentives to engage 356 
actively. 357 
 358 
However, there are two reasons to believe the influence of identified prevalent 359 
stockholders is both considerable and possible. First, blockholders are, as already 360 
noted, generally considered influential. Despite the fact that most passive investors 361 
are characterized by investing small amounts in a multitude of companies to diversify 362 
risk, Fichtner et al. (2017) show that several of the largest investment firms in the US 363 
(including the “Big Three”) are taking active steps toward more centralized 364 
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stewardship and governance processes among their funds, which will allow them to 365 
maximize their voting power across all discretionary holdings. By pooling their funds’ 366 
votes, the “Big Three” have been shown to vote against, and win over, short- and 367 
medium-term oriented investors at critical moments of decision-making (Appel et al. 368 
2016; McCahery et al. 2016; Fichtner et al. 2017). Interestingly, recent analysis of the 369 
voting behavior of the “Big Three” show that these global investors tend to vote 370 
against proposals related to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues 371 
proposed by activist shareholders (Fichtner et al. 2017, pp. 21).  372 
 373 
Second, institutional investors are expected to vote as part of their fiduciary duty to 374 
counterbalance the power of company management. While fiduciary duty has most 375 
often been interpreted by investors as seeking maximum financial returns on 376 
investments for their beneficiaries, there is a growing perception that the fiduciary 377 
duties of institutional investors should include sustainability considerations, even 378 
though it remains a contested position (EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable 379 
Finance 2018). Actors such as pension funds and asset managers also invest for the 380 
long term, and at least some of the large investors are recognizing both their influence 381 
and their responsibility (Fichtner et al. 2017). As several scholars have noted, such 382 
investments in improved Environmental, Social and Governance criteria (ESG) may 383 
also have financial benefits, thereby providing further incentives for engagement from 384 
the side of stockholders (Margolis and Walsh 2003; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Dimson et 385 
al. 2015; van Duuren et al. 2016).  386 
 387 
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4 Next steps 388 
Financial actors and flows play a key role in the global economy. Through their 389 
influence over economic activities that modify biomes associated with tipping 390 
elements, financial actors can also affect climate stability. Our analysis shows that a 391 
subset of the global financial community plays a particularly important role in this 392 
regard. 393 
 394 
These insights are of relevance to scholars, financial actors and policy makers. First, 395 
we bring to light the key role of large international institutional investors. Their 396 
behavior and influence, as major blockholders in companies directly linked to 397 
economic activities shaping ecosystems all over the world, have yet to be studied in 398 
depth. Second, the approach and results presented here can provide further impetus 399 
for research on how global actors, distant drivers and “telecouplings” affect the 400 
climate system and the biosphere (Liu et al. 2015; Österblom et al. 2015; Scholtens 401 
2017).  402 
 403 
The methodology presented here could be applied to other economic sectors to link 404 
companies and investors to other important biosphere functions. Such analyses could, 405 
and should, be complemented with other financial data. Mapping the links between 406 
financial actors and critical tipping elements in the climate and the broader Earth 407 
system opens up a range of new and important questions. Can fiduciary duty include 408 
damages to global environmental commons, affecting millions of people for 409 
generations to come? How large are the material risks associated with non-linear 410 
changes in these critical biomes, including their climate repercussions? What 411 
 19 
economic, political and social pressures shape the investment and corporate 412 
engagement behavior of “Financial Giants”? And does their voting behavior and 413 
ownership engagement differ across sectors, including those associated with biomes 414 
critical for alternative trajectories of the Earth system (Steffen et al. 2018)? 415 
 416 
Questions such as these require increased attention as scholars, financial institutions, 417 
policy-makers and civil society move forward to address the risks entailed with rapid 418 
global environmental change.  419 
 20 
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Figure and figure captions 525 
Figure 1. Threshold dynamics in selected tipping elements.  526 
See separate JPG files. 527 
Figure 1a. Amazon region. Deforestation in the Amazon region has been a well-528 
known challenge for climate policy for decades. The Amazon biome has been 529 
proposed to contain a tipping point beyond which increasing deforestation could lead 530 
to an abrupt shift from rainforests to savannas and possibly to the emergence of a 531 
semi-desert area (in the driest portion of Northeast Brazil) with detrimental 532 
implications for both the regional and global climate. Symbols display main 533 
environmental and socio-economic drivers.  534 
Figure 1b. Boreal forests. The world’s forests both dampen or amplify 535 
anthropogenic climate change through forest-climate interactions and exchanges of 536 
energy, water, and CO2. Boreal forests play a critical role in the climate system by 537 
affecting the surface albedo. It has been proposed that these forests have a significant 538 
biogeophysical effect on annual mean global temperature. Symbols display main 539 
environmental and socio-economic drivers. See Supporting Information (1) for details 540 
including references. 541 
 542 
 543 
Figure 2. Total ownership by the 16 prevalent stockholders in selected companies 544 
(a) Brazil, soy and beef sectors (b) Russia, wood, pulp and paper sector 545 
(c) Canada, wood, pulp and paper sector 546 
Legend 547 
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See separate PDF files. 548 
 549 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of stock ownership of prevalent stockholders, the “Big 550 
Three” and the largest stockholder in each company (bar charts). For each sector, it 551 
also shows the total market share controlled by selected companies (pie charts). See 552 
Supporting Information (2 ) for methodological details. 553 
 554 
 555 
  556 
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Tables 557 
Table 1. Market share held by the top 4 publicly listed and the top 4 private and 558 
other companies in each sector (%). 559 
Sector Top 4 publicly listed companies 
Top 4 private 
and other 
companies 
Sum of the top 4 
public and top 4 non-
public companies 
Brazil, Beef 70.4% 10.7% 81.0% 
Brazil, Soy 29.0% 32.0% 60.9% 
Canada, Wood, pulp and 
paper 23.4% 12.1% 35.5% 
Russia, Wood, pulp and 
paper 21.3% 45.6% 66.9% 
 560 
Note: The table is based on data from the top 100 companies in each sector (top 50 in 561 
Russia).  ‘Private and other’ include private companies, state-owned companies, 562 
cooperatives, First Nations, and similar. See Supporting Information (3) for details. 563 
 564 
 565 
 566 
  567 
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Table 2. List of financial institutions with ownership in the selected companies in 568 
all selected regions and sectors 569 
Nr Stockholder Location of 
headquarters 
Category of 
stockholder 
Ownership 
breadtha 
Number 
of 
holdings 
≥5% 
Size of 
ownershipb 
(million 
USD) 
1 Blackrock United States 
of America 
Investment 
management firm 
18 7 8,076 
2 Vanguard United States 
of America 
Investment 
management 
firm/Mutual funds 
18 6 6,853 
3 Norway (via 
Norges bank 
and other 
funds) 
Norway State/Bank/Pension 
fund/Sovereign 
wealth fund 
18 0 2,193 
4 Dimensional 
Fund 
Advisors 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management 
firm/Mutual funds 
17 0 1,151 
5 Credit Suisse Switzerland Bank/Investment 
management firm 
12 1 422 
6 Bank of New 
York Mellon 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management 
firm/Bank 
12 0 1,188 
7 State Street United States 
of America 
Investment 
management 
firm/Bank 
11 2 4,804 
8 AXA France Insurance/Investment 
management firm 
10 1 890 
9 JPMorgan 
Chase & Co 
United States 
of America 
Bank/Investment 
management firm 
10 0 1,123 
10 Principal 
Financial 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management firm 
10 0 402 
11 Deutsche 
Bank 
Germany Bank/Investment 
management firm 
10 0 356 
12 Fidelity 
Management 
& Research 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management 
firm/Mutual funds 
9 3 3,200 
13 Stichting 
Pensioenfonds 
ABP 
(National 
Civil Pension 
Fund) 
The 
Netherlands 
Pension fund 9 0 646 
14 Franklin 
Templeton 
Investments 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management firm 
5 0 1,641 
15 Van Eck United States 
of America 
Investment 
management firm 
5 0 337 
16 Russell 
Investments 
United States 
of America 
Investment 
management firm 
5 0 93 
 570 
 29 
Note: a) Ownership breadth is defined as the number of companies in which a 571 
stockholder is invested (Fichtner et al. 2017), out of the 29 companies studied. 572 
b) Size of ownership is calculated as the product between the market capitalization of 573 
the listed company and the percentage of shares directly or indirectly owned by the 574 
stockholder.  575 
 30 
Table 3. Concentration of equity ownership in each publicly listed company, 576 
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 577 
Sector Company HHI 
Average 
HHI per 
sector 
Brazil, Beef 
JBS 4938 
2546 Marfrig 1221 
Minerva 1478 
Brazil, Soy 
Archer Daniels 
Midland 292 345 
Bunge 398 
Canada, 
Wood pulp 
and paper 
Canfor 2904 
1021 
Hokuetsu Kishu Paper 542 
Louisiana-Pacific 384 
Marubeni 308 
Nippon Paper 
Industries 204 
Norbord 2640 
Resolute Forest 
Products 1415 
Tembec 1428 
West Fraser 192 
Weyerhaeuser 195 
Russia, Wood 
pulp and 
paper 
International Paper 306 
2133 
Mondi Ltd. 1308 
Mondi plc 1652 
Sistema 5265 
 578 
Note: The HHI index is computed as the sum of squared ownership (in %). Its 579 
theoretical maximum is 10,000 (monopoly), and its theoretical minimum is 580 
approaching zero (pure competition) (Rhoades, 1993). Note that only shareholders 581 
with shares of at least 0.01% appear in our data.  582 
 31 
Table 4. Total book debt to capital of all selected companies, presented per sector 583 
and compared to industry averages (2016) 584 
Sector Book debt to capital 
Industry total book debt to capital 
(Damodaran 2017) 
Beef 
Brazil 73.7% Food processing, Emerging markets 40.1% 
Soy 
Brazil 25.4% Farming/Agriculture, Global 49.1% 
Wood, pulp and paper 
Canada 56.5% Paper/Forest Products, Global 45.6% 
Wood, pulp and paper 
Russia 53.9% Paper/Forest Products, Global 45.6% 
 585 
Note: The total book debt to capital ratio is calculated as the ratio between the book 586 
value of long-term and short-term debt and the sum between book value of long-term 587 
and short-term debt and the book value of shareholders' equity, following the 588 
methodology adopted by Damodaran (2017). See Supporting Information (5) for 589 
details.  590 
